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INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS 
MARK L. MOVSESIAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last fifty years, arbitration has become the most important 
mechanism for resolving international commercial disputes.1  Firms in 
global commerce routinely agree to submit their disputes to private 
arbitral panels, and states routinely require firms to honor their 
agreements.2  Moreover, states routinely enforce arbitral awards.3  In-
ternational conventions and national laws allow domestic courts to re-
ject arbitral awards in some circumstances, but courts rarely do so.4  
In terms of its integration into domestic legal regimes, international 
commercial arbitration (ICA) qualifies as a great success story. 
The editors of this symposium have asked us to address an inter-
esting question.  Why hasn’t ICA’s success been repeated in the con-
text of international courts?  In the last few decades, states have cre-
ated scores of permanent tribunals with jurisdiction to resolve 
 
* Frederick A. Whitney Professor, St. John’s University School of Law.  I thank Chris Borgen, 
Paul Kirgis, Christine Lazaro, and John McGinnis for their readings of earlier drafts, the par-
ticipants in this symposium for their comments and questions, and Aru Satkalmi at St. John’s 
Rittenberg Law Library for her research assistance.  I am also grateful to Edith Palmer at the 
Law Library of Congress for translating excerpts of the German Constitutional Court’s Vienna 
Convention Decision. 
  1. See TIBOR VARADY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 21-22 (3d 
ed. 2006). 
 2. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 158-59 (2d ed. 
2001) (discussing domestic courts’ bias in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements).  On the 
prevalence of arbitration clauses in international contracts, see Christopher R. Drahozal, New 
Experiences of International Arbitration in the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 233, 233 
& n.1 (2006). 
 3. See BORN, supra note 2, at 779-82. 
 4. Id. at 780-81; see also JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 688 (2003) (discussing the frequency with which domestic courts 
enforce international arbitration awards). 
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disputes about international law.5  By and large, though, states have 
not been as receptive to the rulings of these tribunals.  For example, 
domestic courts seem less willing to enforce international court judg-
ments than ICA awards.  What accounts for this comparative lack of 
hospitality?  Why do states treat ICA and international adjudication 
so differently? 
In this essay, I offer an explanation.  States treat ICA and inter-
national adjudication differently because they are categorically dif-
ferent enterprises.  As a private contractual arrangement, ICA does 
not raise serious legitimacy concerns.6  Arbitral awards bind only the 
parties and lack a systemic impact on domestic law.7  Moreover, ICA 
involves commercial disputes between sophisticated international 
traders.  States have little interest in policing such disputes, and com-
mercial law does not differ much from place to place anyway.8  ICA 
helps facilitate global commerce, which in turn promotes domestic 
economic growth.9  Finally, ICA has the support of influential domes-
tic constituencies: firms that rely on arbitration to resolve interna-
 
 5. The literature on international courts is extensive. See, e.g., YUVAL SHANY, 
REGULATING JURISDICTIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS (2007); Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of Na-
tional Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029 (2004); Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International 
Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 675 (2003); Curtis A. Bradley, 
The Federal Judicial Power and the International Legal Order, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 59; Julian G. 
Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court Order, 81 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2006); 
Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429 (2003); Mark 
L. Movsesian, Judging International Judgments, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 65 (2007); Melissa A. Waters, 
Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and En-
forcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487 (2005); A. Mark Weisburd, International Courts and 
American Courts, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 877 (2000); Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a 
Globalizing Judicial System, 54 DUKE L.J. 1143 (2005). 
 6. On the contractual nature of arbitration, see KATHERINE LYNCH, THE FORCES OF 
ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: CHALLENGES TO THE REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 7 (2003) and Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment 
Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 140 
(2006). 
 7. BORN, supra note 2, at 653-54 (“[O]nly the parties to an arbitration agreement can be 
compelled to comply with that agreement.”); cf. John B. Attanasio, Rapporteur’s Overview and 
Conclusions: Of Sovereignty, Globalization, and Courts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN 
NATIONAL COURTS 373, 390 (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996) (“Commercial 
arbitration awards generally have comparatively little impact on national sovereignty.”). 
 8. See Paul R. Dubinsky, Human Rights Law Meets Private Law Harmonization: The 
Coming Conflict, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 211, 218 (2005) (discussing the convergence of contract 
law principles across countries). 
 9. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Law-Making, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1183, 1196 
(2004). 
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tional commercial disputes and lawyers who see a lucrative profes-
sional opportunity.10  Given all this, it is not surprising that states see 
ICA as a promise, not a threat. 
International adjudication does not fit the ICA pattern. (Interna-
tional investment arbitration does not fit the ICA pattern exactly, a 
matter I discuss below.11)  International courts do raise significant le-
gitimacy concerns.  International courts are not ad hoc contractual ar-
rangements, but permanent institutions that create substantial bodies 
of law.12  Their rulings increasingly concern public-law questions on 
which there is little global consensus.  Moreover, the economic bene-
fits of international courts are not so straightforward.  Even when 
they promote domestic growth, international courts can become en-
tangled in sensitive policy debates.  Finally, although some lawyers 
and law professors advocate deference to international courts, inter-
national adjudication does not have the same level of support from 
domestic constituencies as ICA does.  As a result, states tend to be 
much less receptive to international adjudication than ICA. 
This essay proceeds as follows.  First, I describe ICA.  I focus on 
the most important treaty in the area, the United Nations Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(the New York Convention of 1958)13 and the laws of three countries 
that are particularly important in the ICA world: the United States, 
France and Germany.  The New York Convention and the domestic 
laws of these countries all contain a strong pro-arbitration presump-
tion.  I explain why this is so and argue that one example that might 
seem to cast doubt on my theory—international investment arbitra-
tion—in fact does not. 
Next, I turn to international adjudication. I discuss a series of rul-
ings by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the interpretation 
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (the VCCR).  For 
better or worse, the VCCR controversy has become the focal point 
 
 10. Cf. LYNCH, supra note 6, at 19 (discussing how the “center of power” in international 
arbitration resides in “large transnational law firms”). 
 11. See infra notes 71-81and accompanying text. 
 12. For a good overview of contemporary international courts, see THE PROJECT ON 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS [PICT], THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY IN 
CONTEXT: A SYNOPTIC CHART (2004), http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/synoptic_chart/Sy- 
nop_C4.pdf. 
 13. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
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for scholarship on international adjudication; the controversy suggests 
that states are much less comfortable with international courts than 
they are with ICA.  I explore the ways that two domestic courts—the 
United States Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional 
Court—have responded to ICJ rulings in VCCR cases and explain 
why international adjudication has less appeal for states than ICA 
does. 
A caveat is necessary right at the start.  Because of space con-
straints, I have been selective both with regard to countries and tribu-
nals.  I have painted with a broad brush and avoided some technical 
questions that experts on ICA and international courts will quickly 
see.  Nonetheless, I have tried to offer representative illustrations, 
and I hope they help explain why states view ICA and international 
adjudication so differently. 
I. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
In analyzing the domestic treatment of international rulings—
either ICA awards or international-court judgments—it is helpful to 
distinguish among the three different kinds of effect that an interna-
tional ruling might have.  First, a ruling might have enforcement effect.  
A domestic court might compel a party to abide by the ruling in do-
mestic litigation.14  For example, if an ICA panel awards damages in a 
breach of contract dispute, a domestic court might enforce the award 
by requiring the losing party to pay.  Alternatively, the court might 
forbid the party from relitigating a claim that the panel already has 
decided.  (Lawyers sometimes refer to this latter example as recogni-
tion, rather than enforcement, but nothing in this essay turns on that 
distinction).15  Second, a ruling might have precedential effect.16 A do-
mestic court might hold that an international ruling binds not only the 
parties to a particular dispute, but also similarly situated parties in dif-
ferent cases.  For example, the court might believe that it has an obli-
gation to conform its reading of a treaty to the reading given by an in-
ternational tribunal, even in cases involving countries and parties not 
covered by the tribunal’s ruling.  Finally, a ruling might have persua-
sive effect.  A domestic court might decide that, although not binding, 
 
 14. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
UNITED STATES COURTS 1010 (4th ed. 2007). 
 15. See id. (distinguishing between enforcement and recognition). 
 16. See John Harrison, International Adjudicators and Judicial Independence, 30 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 127, 128 (2006). 
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an international ruling contains convincing arguments that the court 
should adopt as its own.17 
In the ICA context, only the first of the three effects is signifi-
cant.  For example, ICA awards lack precedential effect.  As a con-
ceptual matter, an ICA award binds only the parties to a particular 
dispute; outsiders are not affected.18  Indeed, giving ICA awards pre-
cedential effect would entail serious practical difficulties.  Research 
costs would be prohibitive.  First, ICA panels are ephemeral; they 
meet to decide a dispute and then dissolve, and they often leave little 
record of their work.  Further, much ICA is confidential.  Even in 
published opinions, arbitrators do not always explain themselves in 
detail.  Finally, the major international arbitration institutions receive 
thousands of filings a year,19 to say nothing of the many ad hoc arbi-
trations for which data is unavailable.20  Coordinating all these deci-
sions in a way that domestic courts would find useful would be a Her-
culean task.  At the moment, there is no authoritative body that even 
attempts to do so.21 
Similarly, ICA awards lack persuasive effect in domestic law.  
There is no conceptual bar, of course.  Judges could adopt the reason-
ing of particular awards they find convincing, just as they adopt the 
 
 17. Cf. John O. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 303, 310 (2006) 
(distinguishing between “informational” and “dispositional value” of legal authority). 
 18. See BORN, supra note 2, at 653-54; see also INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC 
RULES OF ARBITRATION, art. 28, para. 6 (1998), http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/Court/A- 
rbitration/other/rules_arb_english.pdf (“Every Award shall be binding on the parties.”) (empha-
sis added); see also AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
PROCEDURE: INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES, art. 27, para. 1 (2008), 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=33994#INTERNATIONAL%20ARBITRATION%20RULES 
(“Awards . . . shall be final and binding on the parties.”) (emphasis added); ALAN REDFERN & 
MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 397 
(3d ed. 1999) (“[A]n award can neither directly confer rights nor impose obligations upon a per-
son who is not a party to the arbitration agreement.”).  For example, in the view of the United 
States Supreme Court, “a particular arbitration is a ‘one-off’ event devoid of larger systemic 
consequences.” Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 773, 807 (2002). 
 19. TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL 
RESEARCH 341 (Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005) (showing numbers 
of filings from 1993-2003). 
 20. Drahozal, supra note 2, at 233 n.2. 
 21. For a proposal for a new international tribunal on the enforceability of international 
commercial arbitration awards, see Howard M. Holtzmann, A Task for the 21st Century: Creating 
a New International Court for Resolving Disputes on the Enforceability of Arbitral Awards, in 
THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE LCIA CENTENARY 
CONFERENCE 109 (Martin Hunter et al. eds., 1995). 
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reasoning of particular treatises and law review articles they find con-
vincing.  But domestic courts generally do not cite arbitral awards.  
Once again, practical factors, especially the confidential and ad hoc 
character of much ICA, probably explain this phenomenon.  What-
ever the reasons, ICA awards simply do not appear on the radar 
screens of most judges. 
States do grant ICA awards a powerful enforcement effect, how-
ever.  The New York Convention, the most important treaty on ICA 
with roughly 140 member states, contains a strong pro-enforcement 
presumption, as do the laws of most countries, certainly the laws of 
most developed countries.22  In understanding this pro-enforcement 
presumption, it is useful to look at two focal points in the arbitration 
process: a domestic court’s decision whether to enforce an arbitration 
agreement, and its decision whether to enforce an arbitral award ren-
dered in a different country.23  At both points, a domestic court must 
decide whether or not to defer to the ICA regime.  In both situations, 
contemporary principles routinely require courts to defer. 
In deciding whether to enforce an arbitration agreement, a do-
mestic court has two options.  The court can either enforce the 
agreement and send the parties to an international arbitral panel or 
scrap the agreement and force the parties to litigate in the domestic 
forum.  The New York Convention creates a strong presumption in 
favor of the first option.24  Article II provides that “[t]he court of a 
Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of 
which the parties have made” a valid arbitration agreement, “shall . . . 
refer the parties to arbitration.”25  Article II allows courts to avoid re-
ferring parties to arbitration in certain exceptional cases, such as 
 
 22. See BORN, supra note 2, at 20-23 (discussing the New York Convention), 39-40 (dis-
cussing national laws on arbitration); see also UNCITRAL, Status: 1958 Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ 
uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last visited May 18, 2008) (listing mem-
bers of the Convention). 
 23. A domestic court’s decision to vacate an award rendered in the country where the court 
sits presents a similar choice, but in the interests of space it is not discussed here.  In the vacatur 
context, too, international arbitral awards are presumptively valid under contemporary princi-
ples.  For more on this topic, see LEW ET AL., supra note 4, at 673-78; James M. Gaitis, Interna-
tional and Domestic Arbitration Procedure: The Need for a Rule Providing a Limited Opportu-
nity for Arbitral Reconsideration of Reasoned Awards, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 9, 13, 53-63 
(2004). 
 24. See BORN, supra note 2, at 157-59. 
 25. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. II(3). 
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where the arbitration agreement was the result of fraud.  Domestic 
courts generally construe these exceptions quite narrowly, however.26 
The most important exception relates to the “arbitrability” of a 
dispute.  Under Article II, a court need not enforce an arbitration 
agreement if the “subject matter” is one not “capable of settlement by 
arbitration” under domestic law.27 Arbitrability is a vague concept, 
but the gist of the doctrine is that certain categories of public-law 
claims are too sensitive to give to private arbitrators.28 For example, 
employment, intellectual property, and family-law disputes histori-
cally have not been arbitrable in some countries.29 Similarly, some 
countries historically have refused to allow the arbitration of antitrust 
claims.30  Today, though, there is “a steady trend towards a more lib-
eral approach” to arbitrability in most countries.31 In contemporary 
practice, most claims are arbitrable, at least in the international com-
mercial context.32 
The leading American case on arbitrability is Mitsubishi Motors 
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, which the Supreme Court decided in 
1985.33 Mitsubishi concerned the arbitrability of federal antitrust 
claims.  Although American courts traditionally had refused to allow 
the arbitration of such claims, the Mitsubishi court believed it was 
“necessary for national courts to subordinate domestic notions of ar-
bitrability to the international policy favoring commercial arbitra-
tion.”34  If private firms agreed to arbitrate antitrust claims, American 
courts should let them: “concerns of international comity,” as well as 
“sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system,” 
counseled in favor of enforcing parties’ agreements.35  Besides, the 
Court noted, there would be a chance to review the arbitrators’ work 
when the time came to enforce the eventual award.  While “substan-
 
 26. See BORN, supra note 2, at 160. 
 27. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. II(1).  The Convention does not specify what 
body of law should govern the arbitrability question; most courts apply their own domestic law.  
For a brief discussion, see LEW ET AL., supra note 4, at 189-91. 
 28. See LEW ET AL., supra note 4, at 188; see also Patrick M. Baron & Stefan Liniger, A 
Second Look at Arbitrability, 19 ARB. INT’L 27, 27 (2003). 
 29. BORN, supra note 2, at 245-46. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Baron & Liniger, supra note 28, at 53. 
 32. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 18, at 154. 
 33. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
 34. Id. at 639. 
 35. Id. at 629. 
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tive review at the award-enforcement stage” would be minimal, there 
would be sufficient opportunity to ensure that the arbitrators had at 
least considered parties’ antitrust claims.36 
Other countries take a similar approach.  For example, in France, 
a country that has played a large role in the development of interna-
tional commercial arbitration,37 there is a strong presumption in favor 
of arbitrability.38  Although the Civil Code prohibits the arbitration of 
“any matter that concerns the public order,”39 the French courts have 
construed this limitation quite narrowly.40  In practice, the French ap-
proach is indistinguishable from Mitsubishi Motors.41  Similarly, Ger-
many recently amended its arbitration law to expand the concept of 
arbitrability substantially.42  Under the 1998 law, which is modeled on 
the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law, arbitration agreements can 
extend generally to “[a]ny claim involving an economic interest.”43  
This category is understood to cover a “broad range of disputes.”44 
The decision whether to enforce an award presents a similar 
choice.  The domestic court can defer to the international panel and 
require the parties to comply with the award or ignore the panel’s rul-
ing and require the parties to litigate again in the domestic forum.  
Once again, contemporary principles favor the international regime.  
The New York Convention creates a clear presumption in favor of 
enforcing awards.45  Under Article V, domestic courts can decline en-
forcement only in limited circumstances, many of which focus on pro-
 
 36. Id. at 638. 
 37. See Carbonneau, supra note 18, at 781 (discussing French role in development of inter-
national commercial arbitration). 
 38. See Matthias Lehmann, Comment, A Plea for a Transnational Approach to Arbitrability 
in Arbitral Practice, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 753, 774 (2004). 
 39. Code civil [C. CIV.] art. 2060 (Fr.), quoted in VARADY ET AL., supra note 1, at 220. 
 40. See Lehmann, supra note 38, at 766. 
 41. See id.; Thomas E. Carbonneau & Francois Janson, Cartesian Logic and Frontier Poli-
tics: French and American Concepts of Arbitrability, 2 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 193, 219-20 
(1994). 
 42. See Baron & Liniger, supra note 28, at 36. 
 43. Burgerliches Gesetzbuch X [BGBX] [Civil Code Book X] Jan. 1, 1998, Bundesgesetz-
blatt [BGBl] I, § 1030, ¶ 1, quoted in PETER BINDER, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION IN UNCITRAL MODEL LAW JURISDICTIONS 21 (2000). 
 44. STEFAN RUTZEL ET AL., COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN GERMANY 114 
(2005). 
 45. See BORN, supra note 2, at 779-80; see also REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 18, at 460 
(explaining that, under the New York Convention, “the grounds for refusing . . . enforcement of 
arbitral awards should be applied restrictively”). 
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cedural problems like lack of notice or inability to present one’s 
case.46  Although some of Article V’s exceptions are substantive – for 
example, a court may decline to enforce an award that is “contrary to 
the public policy” of the forum state—domestic courts have construed 
these exceptions narrowly.47  Notably, none of Article V’s exceptions 
relate to the merits of a dispute.48  A domestic court cannot refuse to 
enforce an award simply because the court believes the arbitral panel 
decided the case incorrectly.49 
National arbitration laws, particularly in developed countries, 
endorse this pro-enforcement presumption.50  In the United States, 
the Federal Arbitration Act “incorporates Article V’s exceptions by 
reference,”51 providing that a domestic “court shall confirm [an] 
award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal . . . specified in 
the . . . Convention.”52 In construing these exceptions, American 
courts have demonstrated a strong “‘pro-enforcement bias.’”53 For 
example, American judges have interpreted the public-policy excep-
tion quite narrowly to cover “only” those situations in which “en-
forcement would violate the forum state’s most basic notions of mo-
rality and justice.”54 International commercial disputes do not 
 
 46. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V; see William W. Park & Alexander A. Ya-
nos, Treaty Obligations and National Law: Emerging Conflicts in International Arbitration, 58 
HASTINGS L.J. 251, 258-59 (2006) (reviewing exceptions); see also May Lu, Note, The New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: Analysis of the 
Seven Defenses to Oppose Enforcement in the United States and England, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 747, 769-71 (2006) (reviewing exceptions). 
 47. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(2); see Lu, supra note 46, at 771. 
 48. Lucy Reed & Phillip Riblett, Expansion of Defenses to Enforcement of International 
Arbitral Awards in U.S. Courts?, 13 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 121, 121 (2006). 
 49. In domestic arbitration, American courts have held that awards may be vacated for se-
rious legal errors under the “manifest disregard” doctrine.  Drahozal, supra note 2, at 240.  A 
party seeking to vacate an award “must show that the arbitrators knew of the governing legal 
standard but intentionally disregarded it, and that the legal standard was well defined and 
plainly applicable to the case.”  Id. at 240-41.  So far, American courts have declined to apply 
the manifest disregard standard in the context of international arbitral awards.  See id. (asserting 
that manifest disregard standard does not apply under the New York Convention); see also 
Reed & Riblett, supra note 48, at 122 (noting that American courts “have not yet applied the 
‘manifest disregard of the law’ doctrine to . . . refuse to enforce an international arbitral 
award”). 
 50. BORN, supra note 2, at 780. 
 51. Id. 
 52. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2006). 
 53. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 18, at 460 (citation omitted). 
 54. Parsons and Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L’Industrie du Papier 
(RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974). 
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typically implicate such concerns, and parties who raise the public-
policy defense in American courts tend not to succeed.55 
Other national laws also adopt a pro-arbitration stance. In 
France, the Civil Code’s provision on enforcement closely tracks Ar-
ticle V;56 as a practical matter, French courts are even more pro-
enforcement than the Convention requires.57  In Germany, the 1998 
law adopts Article V’s exceptions as the exclusive grounds for refus-
ing to enforce ICA awards.58  Review on the merits is not allowed,59 
and the “assumption” is that awards will be enforced.60  For example, 
in order to resist enforcement on public-policy grounds, a party must 
show, not simply that enforcement would contravene an important 
public policy, but that enforcement would be “unbearable due to a 
gross violation of the fundamental principles of German public and 
economical life.”61 
Three factors explain why states have adopted a pro-
enforcement presumption in the ICA context.  First, enforcing an ar-
bitral award does not raise concerns about legitimacy.  In liberal de-
mocracies, legitimacy turns on the process by which law is made.62  To 
be legitimate, law must be made by actors who are publicly account-
able, directly or indirectly.63  These actors should be familiar with lo-
cal institutions and concerns.64  Public accountability helps ensure that 
law is generally acceptable to those who must comply with it.  Deci-
 
 55. See Lu, supra note 46, at 771; see also Reed & Riblett, supra note 48, at 122 (noting that 
“recent cases confirm that this defense remains a very high hurdle for those attempting to . . . 
avoid enforcement of international arbitral awards”). 
 56. See Code civil [C. CIV.] art. 1502 (Fr.), quoted in BORN, supra note 2, at 785. 
 57. See Lynch, supra note 6, at 190; see also Nicolas Brooke & Elie Kleiman, France, in 
ICLG TO: INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 164, 169-70 (2007), available at www.iclg.co.uk/khad- 
min/Publications/pdf/1436.pdf (discussing French law on enforcement of awards). 
 58. Stefan Kroll & Marc-Oliver Heidkamp, The German Law On The Recognition And 
Enforcement Of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 18 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 28, 31 (2003). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Stefan M. Kroll, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Germany, 
5 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 160, 165 (2002). 
 61. Kroll & Heidkamp, supra note 58, at 34. 
 62. Cf. John O. McGinnis, The Appropriate Hierarchy of Global Multilateralism and Cus-
tomary International Law: The Example of the WTO, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 229, 233 (2003) (arguing 
that the process of its derivation reduces the legitimacy of customary international law). 
 63. See Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegation, the Structural Constitution, and Self-
Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (2003). 
 64. See Movsesian, supra note 5, at 94-95. 
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sions by unaccountable actors, or by actors who lack familiarity with 
local practice, could easily conflict with the will of the governed. 
Of course, arbitrators are not accountable to the public, directly 
or indirectly.  They are accountable to the parties who choose them, 
and perhaps also to their institutional sponsors.65  Moreover, arbitra-
tors do not necessarily have a good feel for domestic legal institutions 
and practice.  Parties select arbitrators more for their expertise in in-
ternational business law and practice.  Nonetheless, legitimacy ques-
tions are largely absent in the ICA context.  Because an ICA award 
affects only the parties, enforcement has a very limited domestic im-
pact.  This explains why domestic judges are willing to enforce an 
award even when arbitrators have made serious legal errors.  The par-
ties contemplated the risk of legal errors when they signed the arbi-
tration agreement, and there is no danger that the arbitrators’ mis-
takes will creep into the substance of domestic law. 
The nature of the disputes involved also limits ICA’s domestic 
impact.  Most arbitral awards relate to commercial disputes between 
firms in international transactions.  States have relatively little inter-
est in policing such disputes.  The parties are usually sophisticated ac-
tors of roughly equal bargaining power, and concerns about unfair 
surprise and oppression do not arise.66  Moreover, international con-
tract doctrine is becoming standardized.  Commercial law varies less 
and less from place to place,67 and there is general agreement on the 
benefits of the free market.68  Despite some regional differences, “the 
basic liberal governing structure for the state and the economy is 
 
 65. See Thomas E. Carbonneau & Andrew W. Sheldrick, Tax Liability and Inarbitrability 
in International Commercial Arbitration, 1 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 23, 27 (1992) (arbitrators 
are accountable basically to the parties alone); Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Im-
munity in an Age of Mandatory and Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449, 498 (2004) 
(arbitrators are not publicly accountable). 
 66. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of National Law: An Empirical Look at 
the New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523, 531 (2005) (defending the assumption 
that parties in international commercial arbitration are “sophisticated and well-informed”); 
Catherine A. Rogers, Context and Institutional Structure in Attorney Regulation: Constructing an 
Enforcement Regime for International Arbitration, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 21 (2003) (describing 
degree of sophistication and financial resources of parties in international commercial arbitra-
tion). 
 67. See Dubinsky, supra note 8. 
 68. See LYNCH, supra note 6, at 46. 
MOVSESIAN_FMT2.DOC 10/15/2008  2:23:46 PM 
434 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 18:423 
 
largely uncontested.”69  Thus, in the typical international arbitration, 
there is relatively little danger that arbitrators will depart significantly 
from consensus norms. 
To be sure, unlike ICA, some investment arbitration does raise 
legitimacy concerns.70  Throughout the 1990s, states entered into 
thousands of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that confer signifi-
cant rights on foreign investors.71  The terms vary, but most BITs re-
quire the host state to provide “fair and equitable treatment” and 
“full protection and security” for foreign investments; often, BITs 
contain express most-favored-nation and national-treatment obliga-
tions as well.72  Most BITs provide for the arbitration of disputes be-
tween investors and host governments, either before an ad hoc panel 
or an arbitration institution, the most important of which is the Inter-
national Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).73  
For example, the investment chapter of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a multilateral treaty among Canada, 
Mexico, and the United States, allows an investor to choose between 
ICSID and ad hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL rules.74 
Unlike ICA, investment arbitration typically involves high-stakes 
claims with the potential to alter domestic law.  Investors “regularly 
seek to recover hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars” from 
domestic authorities.75  Because the rights that investment treaties 
confer are so open-ended, investors’ claims can cover a variety of sen-
sitive issues, including tax and monetary policy, product safety rules, 
environmental regulations, even the conduct of jury trials.76  Although 
arbitral panels cannot order states to amend their laws, the prospect 
of large damage awards, enforceable in domestic courts, may have a 
 
 69. YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 
314 (1996). 
 70. See Christopher J. Borgen, Transnational Tribunals and the Transmission of Norms: 
The Hegemony of Process, GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. (forthcoming 2008). 
 71. CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 26 
(2007). 
 72. Id. at 30. 
 73. LEW ET AL., supra note 4, at 763. 
 74. Id. at 770-71.  Because neither Canada nor Mexico is presently a member of the ICSID 
Convention, NAFTA arbitrations must use ICSID’s Additional Facilities Rules.  Matthias 
Lehmann, Options for Dispute Resolution under the Investment Chapters of NAFTA and 
CAFTA, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 387, 401 (2005). 
 75. Drahozal, supra note 2, at 247. 
 76. See Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 6, at 146-47. 
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substantial chilling effect.  Rather than run the risk of an adverse ar-
bitral decision, domestic authorities might decline to take action they 
believe to be in the public interest.77 
These concerns are valid, but one should not overestimate the 
domestic impact of investment arbitration.  While the chilling effect is 
a theoretical possibility, in practice investors have not been able to 
win large awards against host countries.78  Moreover, after some close 
calls, states have begun to appreciate the danger and adopt “safe-
guards to ensure that the protection of investors . . . does not threaten 
the ability of governments to regulate in the public interest.” 79  For 
example, even though the United States has so far avoided liability, 
its experience with NAFTA arbitrations has led it to clarify and nar-
row its obligations in subsequent investment treaties.80  The Australia-
United States Free Trade Agreement, adopted in 2004, does not even 
allow investors to arbitrate claims against host governments.81  Thus, 
while investment arbitration presents more of a legitimacy threat than 
ICA, the threat is still somewhat limited. 
Second, by making the arbitration regime more effective, the 
pro-enforcement presumption creates significant economic benefits 
for states.  As economists since Ricardo have recognized, interna-
tional commerce promotes domestic economic growth.82  The well-
known theory of comparative advantage explains why.  By selling 
those goods and services they can produce comparatively efficiently 
and purchasing the rest, nations can capture the benefits of specializa-
tion and become more prosperous.  Practical experience since World 
War II confirms this dynamic.  As communications and other techno-
logical barriers have fallen, international commerce has increased, 
 
 77. Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in its Tenth Year: An Interim 
Sketch of Selected Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1381, 1438 (2003). 
 78. Id. at 1438-39 (discussing NAFTA arbitration); see also Susan D. Franck, Empirically 
Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 6 (2007). 
 79. Gilbert Gagne & Jean-Frederic Morin, The Evolving American Policy on Investment 
Protection: Evidence from Recent FTAs and the 2004 Model BIT, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 357, 358 
(2006). 
 80. See id. at 367. 
 81. William S. Dodge, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed Countries: Re-
flections on the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 2 
(2006). 
 82. For a detailed discussion of the points in this paragraph, see John O. McGinnis & Mark 
L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 521-23 (2000). 
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creating substantial wealth effects for nations that participate in the 
global market. 
ICA facilitates international commerce by reducing intangible 
barriers to cross-border trade.  Although contract law does not differ 
that much from nation to nation, there remains a risk that local courts 
will treat outsiders unfairly.83  By providing a neutral forum for resolv-
ing disputes, ICA helps minimize this danger.84  Similarly, firms may 
worry that litigation will expose them to negative publicity, or that 
generalist domestic judges will lack practical knowledge of the ins-
and-outs of the parties’ particular business.85  In ICA, parties can keep 
their disputes mostly confidential, and can select arbitrators on the 
basis of business expertise.86  ICA thus ameliorates these worries as 
well.87 
Of course, the benefits of neutrality, confidentiality, and exper-
tise are meaningful only if parties can obtain domestic enforcement of 
their arbitration awards.88  This explains why the pro-enforcement 
presumption is so important.  The presumption helps assure that, if a 
party prevails in arbitration, it will be able to enforce the award with-
out having to retry its claims in local courts.  The presumption helps 
assure that an award has cash value. 
Third, two key domestic constituencies have strong incentives to 
push for a pro-enforcement regime: firms involved in international 
transactions and the lawyers that represent them.  Domestic firms 
benefit from a pro-enforcement regime in two ways.  First, because 
foreign countries will probably not enforce awards against their own 
citizens unless other countries reciprocate,89 the domestic firms have 
an incentive to make sure that their governments do not oppose en-
forcement.  Second, a pro-enforcement regime helps to reassure for-
 
 83. See Ya-Wei Li, Note, Dispute Resolution Clauses in International Contracts: An Em-
pirical Study, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 789, 795 (2006). 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. at 796. 
 86. See id. 
 87. A 1996 survey revealed that sophisticated players viewed neutrality, confidentiality, 
and expertise as among arbitration’s most important advantages.  VARADY ET AL., supra note 1, 
at 20-21. 
 88. See BORN, supra note 2, at 704 (“[T]he ultimate test of any arbitration proceeding is its 
ability to render an award which, if necessary, will be recognized and enforced in relevant na-
tional courts.”). 
 89. Tom Ginsburg, The Culture of Arbitration, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1335, 1343 
(2003). 
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eign parties that they will be able to collect against the firms in the 
event of a dispute.  A pro-enforcement regime thus makes domestic 
firms more attractive business partners and helps them compete in 
the international setting. 
Lawyers also have a strong interest in promoting a pro-
enforcement regime.  As international commerce has grown, large 
law firms, particularly the major Anglo- American firms that domi-
nate private international law, have expanded their ICA practices.90  
These firms “now . . . include [ICA] in the gamut of services” they 
provide their clients, and they have an obvious stake in ICA’s expan-
sion.91  Moreover, international business lawyers often aspire to be-
come arbitrators themselves.92  Being an arbitrator confers significant 
professional status and has substantial financial rewards, particularly 
if one is associated with one of the elite arbitration institutions.93  And 
the more ICA there is, the more jobs there will be for arbitrators.94  
Lawyers thus have powerful, tangible incentives to encourage ICA’s 
acceptance by domestic authorities. 
In sum, ICA’s limited impact on domestic law, its beneficial ef-
fect on the domestic economy, and its ability to harness influential 
domestic interests explain why states are so receptive toward it.  
When one turns to consider international adjudication, however, a 
very different picture emerges.  Although international courts are 
relatively new, and the law on them is still evolving, it is fair to say 
that states seem less enthusiastic about international adjudication 
than ICA. 
II. INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
To understand the domestic effect of international adjudication, 
it is helpful to focus on the international court that has drawn the 
most attention in recent years, the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ).  As “the principal judicial organ of the United Nations,” the 
 
 90. LYNCH, supra note 6, at 19. 
 91. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 69, at 37. 
 92. See Bryant G. Garth, How to Become an International Commercial Arbitrator, 8 
WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 10, 10 (1997). 
 93. Id.; see also Susan D. Franck, The Role of International Arbitrators, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 499, 516-17 (2006) (noting that “[a]rbitrators can earn hundreds of thousands of dol-
lars from a single arbitration”). 
 94. See Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 6, at 148 (discussing investment arbitration). 
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ICJ resolves legal disputes between UN members.95  Although states 
can submit to the Court’s general jurisdiction, they typically refer dis-
putes to the ICJ in the context of particular treaties.96  Hundreds of 
bilateral and multilateral treaties grant the ICJ jurisdiction over dis-
putes about their interpretation and application.97  Some of these trea-
ties address uncontroversial matters, but others cover divisive issues 
like criminal punishment, the environment, race and sex discrimina-
tion, and national security.98  The United States is party to at least 
seventy such treaties.99 
The ICJ Statute provides that only states may appear as parties 
before the Court.100  A judgment binds only the parties, and only in 
respect of the particular dispute.101  The UN Charter requires that par-
ties comply with an ICJ judgment, but the Charter does not address a 
judgment’s effect in domestic law.102  Rather, the Charter contem-
plates enforcement by the UN itself.  Under Article 94, a prevailing 
party may apply to the Security Council for assistance if a losing party 
fails to comply with an ICJ ruling.  The Council “may, if it deems nec-
essary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken 
to give effect to the judgment.”103  Parties rarely seek assistance, how-
ever, and the “Council has never acted to enforce an ICJ decision.”104 
A significant difference from ICA is immediately apparent.  
While the New York Convention creates a pro-enforcement pre-
sumption, the ICJ Statute and the UN Charter leave the question of 
domestic enforcement to states themselves.  And states have been 
comparatively unreceptive—particularly when ICJ rulings have an 
impact on domestic policy questions.  Consider, for example, the fa-
miliar controversy over the ICJ’s interpretation of the Vienna Con-
 
 95. U.N. Charter art. 92. 
 96. Movsesian, supra note 5, at 73-74. 
 97. See Fred L. Morrison, Treaties as a Source of Jurisdiction, Especially in U.S. Practice, in 
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 58, 61 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 
1987).  For a list, see International Court of Justice, Jurisdiction, Treaties, http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=4 (last visited November 23, 2007). 
 98. See Morrison, supra note 97, at 61. 
 99. Ku, supra note 5, at 35. 
 100. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34, para. 1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055 
[hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
 101. Id. art. 59. 
 102. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1. 
 103. Id. art. 94, para. 2. 
 104. Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive The-
ory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1308 (2004). 
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vention on Consular Relations (the VCCR).105  Among other things, 
the VCCR requires that domestic law enforcement authorities give 
foreign nationals the opportunity to communicate with their consu-
lates in the event they are arrested.106  An Optional Protocol grants 
the ICJ jurisdiction over disputes about the VCCR’s interpretation 
and application.107 
In a series of rulings beginning in the late 1990s, the ICJ has held 
that the United States has failed to fulfill the consular-assistance re-
quirement.108  The most recent of these cases, Avena and Other Mexi-
can Nationals (Mexico v. United States), addressed the status of fifty-
one Mexican nationals on death row in the United States.109  The ICJ 
held that, where American courts had convicted foreign nationals and 
sentenced them to “severe penalities,” the United States must remedy 
its VCCR violations by providing judicial review and reconsideration 
of the convictions, notwithstanding any procedural bars under local 
law.110  The United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol 
shortly after Avena came down, thereby ending the ICJ’s jurisdiction 
over VCCR claims against the United States, but President Bush is-
sued an order directing state courts to comply with Avena itself in the 
interest of international comity.111 
The reaction of American courts to these ICJ rulings has been 
tepid at best.  For example, in its 1998 decision in Breard v. Greene, 
the Supreme Court held that provisional ICJ orders are not enforce-
able domestically. 112  In Breard, Virginia had convicted a Paraguayan 
defendant of capital murder and sentenced him to death.  Shortly be-
fore his scheduled execution date, Paraguay brought an action in the 
ICJ alleging that the United States had violated the VCCR by failing 
to notify him of his consular assistance rights.113  When the ICJ or-
 
 105. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 
261 [hereinafter VCCR].  The VCCR controversy has drawn intense attention from interna-
tional law scholars.  See Movsesian, supra note 5, at 76. 
 106. See VCCR, supra note 105, art. 36, para. 1. 
 107. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the 
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487. 
 108. For a more detailed description of these cases, see Movsesian, supra note 5, at 76-87. 
 109. Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 
(Mar. 31). 
 110. Id. at 69-70. 
 111. See Movsesian, supra note 5, at 80-81. 
 112. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1998). 
 113. Id. at 374. 
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dered a stay of execution to allow it to hear Paraguay’s claim, the Su-
preme Court declined to enforce it.114  The Court held that the defen-
dant’s VCCR claims were procedurally barred under federal law, and 
that there was no reason to wait to hear what the ICJ would decide.115  
The ICJ’s views would be entitled only to “respectful consideration” 
and would not bind American courts.116 
In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, decided in 2006, the Court held 
that final ICJ judgments lack precedential effect in U.S. courts.117  In 
Sanchez-Llamas, a state court had convicted a Honduran national, 
Mario Bustillo, of murder.118  Local authorities had failed to notify 
Bustillo of his right to consular assistance when they arrested him, but 
Bustillo did not raise this issue at trial or on appeal, and state courts 
ruled that his VCCR claim was procedurally defaulted.119  In the Su-
preme Court, Bustillo argued that Avena required that his conviction 
be reconsidered.120  Because he was not one of the Mexicans covered 
by Avena, Bustillo could not seek enforcement of the ICJ judgment 
itself.121  Rather, he maintained that the ICJ’s reasoning also applied 
to third parties like himself.  The ICJ had interpreted the VCCR to 
preclude the assertion of state procedural default rules, he argued, 
and the Supreme Court should conform to the ICJ’s interpretation.122 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. Once again, the 
Court explained that ICJ judgments merited only “‘respectful consid-
eration;’” American courts had no obligation to adopt the ICJ’s rea-
soning.123  The Court explained itself in dualist terms.  The ICJ could 
resolve disputes between UN members, but that was strictly an inter-
national matter – a question, ultimately, for the Security Council.124  
For domestic purposes, the Constitution gave American courts the 
power to interpret treaties.125  Moreover, the ICJ had misinterpreted 
 
 114. Id. at 379. 
 115. See id. at 375-76. 
 116. See id. at 375, 378. 
 117. 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2683 (2006). 
 118. Id. at 2676. 
 119. Id. at 2676-77. 
 120. See id. at 2683. 
 121. See Harrison, supra note 16, at 128. 
 122. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2683. 
 123. Id. at 2685 (quoting Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998)). 
 124. Id. at 2684-85. 
 125. Id. at 2684. 
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the VCCR.126  The Court argued that one could not plausibly read the 
VCCR to override local procedural default rules.  Such rules were 
fundamental to an adversarial system like that of the United States; 
the VCCR itself required foreign nationals to exercise their consular-
assistance rights “‘in conformity with the laws and regulations of the 
receiving state.’”127  The Sanchez-Llamas Court thus declined to give 
Avena even persuasive effect (though the Court’s reference to “re-
spectful consideration” suggested it would have done so if, in fact, it 
had been persuaded). 
The Court considered the enforcement effect of final ICJ judg-
ments just this term in Medellin v. Texas, a case that involved the 
claims of one of the Mexican nationals covered by Avena.128  Medellin 
has a complicated history. Jose Medellin was convicted of capital 
murder in Texas in 1997.  Although state authorities failed to notify 
him of his right to seek consular assistance, Medellin did not raise a 
VCCR claim until his first habeas action, by which time it was proce-
durally barred under Texas law.129  When the ICJ decided Avena in 
2004, Medellin argued that the international court’s ruling required 
that his conviction be reconsidered.130  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to resolve this question in 2005, but dismissed the case as 
potentially moot after President Bush issued his order directing state 
courts to comply with Avena.131  Medellin returned to seek habeas in 
the Texas courts, where once more he was unsuccessful.  Once again, 
the Court granted certiorari to hear Medellin’s claims.132 
This time, the Court made clear that ICJ judgments lack en-
forcement effect in American courts.133  As in Sanchez-Llamas, the 
Court relied on a dualist analysis.  Once again, it emphasized the in-
ternational quality of ICJ rulings in VCCR cases.134  The UN Charter 
envisioned enforcement by the Security Council, not domestic 
 
 126. Id. at 2685. 
 127. Id. at 2686 (quoting VCCR, supra note 105, art. 36, para. 2). 
 128. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008). 
 129. Id. at 1354. 
 130. See id. at 1355. 
 131. See id. at 1356. 
 132. See id. 
 133. Id. at 1367.  The Court also ruled that President Bush had no authority to order state 
courts to comply with the ICJ’s ruling in Avena, id. at 1367-72, but I do not address that ques-
tion here. 
 134. See id at 1356. 
MOVSESIAN_FMT2.DOC 10/15/2008  2:23:46 PM 
442 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 18:423 
 
courts;135  indeed, nothing in the Charter, the ICJ Statute, or the Op-
tional Protocol could be read to give domestic judges authority to en-
force ICJ judgments.136  Notably, the Court drew a distinction be-
tween the ICJ and ICA regimes.  In the ICA context, Congress had 
expressly provided for the domestic-court enforcement of arbitral 
awards when it implemented the New York Convention.137  If Con-
gress had contemplated domestic-court enforcement of ICJ rulings, 
the Court reasoned, Congress would have adopted similar imple-
menting legislation in the ICJ context as well.138 
Breard, Sanchez-Llamas, and Medellin make clear that American 
courts are not receptive to the notion of giving domestic effect to ICJ 
rulings.  The situation in other countries is more nuanced, but, on the 
whole, domestic courts everywhere seem reluctant to give much 
weight to ICJ rulings.  There is apparently no country in which courts 
give ICJ judgments enforcement effect.139  A recent German decision 
suggests that ICJ judgments might have precedential effect, but the 
full implications of that decision are unclear.140  In its Vienna Conven-
tion Decision—a German counterpart to Sanchez-Llamas—a cham-
ber of the Federal Constitutional Court held that German courts have 
a constitutional duty to consider the ICJ’s views in VCCR cases.141  
The case concerned three foreign defendants who had been convicted 
of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.142  Local authorities 
had failed to inform them of their rights to consular assistance, but 
 
 135. Id. at 1358-60. 
 136. See id. at 1364-65. 
 137. Id. at 1366. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See id. at 1363; Weisburd, supra note 5, at 299. 
 140. See Klaus Ferdinand Garditz, Article 36, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations – 
Treaty Interpretation and Enforcement – International Court of Justice – Fair Trial – Suppression 
of Evidence, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 627, 629-30, 632 (2007).  It is worth noting that Germany had 
been the victorious party in one of the early VCCR cases against the United States; it would 
have been embarrassing for Germany to deny effect to ICJ rulings while arguing that the United 
States must comply.  Id. at 634-35. 
 141. See Carsten Hoppe, Implementation of LaGrand and Avena in Germany and the United 
States: Exploring a Transatlantic Divide in Search of a Uniform Interpretation of Consular 
Rights, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 317, 331 (2007). The fact that the decision was issued by a Chamber of 
the Constitutional Court, and not a full Senate, indicates that the court did not think the case 
presented a “‘fundamental issue.’” Id. at 334-35; see also The Federal Constitutional Court, Or-
ganization, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/organization/organization.html (last vis-
ited November 27, 2007) (F.R.G.) (“[I]n proceedings of fundamental importance . . . it is always 
the Senate that decides.”). 
 142. Garditz, supra note 140, at 627. 
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the defendants did not raise any VCCR claims until they filed appeals 
with the Federal Court of Justice.143  When that court rejected their 
claims, the defendants filed complaints with the Constitutional Court, 
arguing that the authorities’ failure to advise them of their VCCR 
rights violated their fair-trial rights under the German Constitution.144 
The Constitutional Court agreed with the defendants and or-
dered the Court of Justice to reconsider the convictions.145  In the 
course of its ruling, the Constitutional Court criticized the Court of 
Justice for failing to “‘take into account’” the ICJ’s views on the 
proper interpretation of the VCCR.146  Unfortunately, the Constitu-
tional Court did not make clear precisely what “take into account” 
means.147  The phrase may mean that ICJ opinions have precedential 
force—that German courts must defer to the ICJ’s interpretation 
unless there is a conflict “with constitutional provisions such as those 
defining fundamental rights”148—but a narrower reading is also possi-
ble, one that requires only that German courts explain their depar-
tures from the ICJ.149  The Court of Justice will presumably clarify the 
proper reading when it hears the case again on remand. 
To be sure, national courts in Europe are receptive to the judg-
ments of regional courts like the European Court of Justice (the ECJ) 
and the European Court of Human Rights (the ECHR).  As a general 
matter, the rulings of these courts receive both enforcement and pre-
cedential effect in domestic courts.150  But the European situation is 
unique, and the factors that explain the success of these regional 
courts do not exist in the broader international context.151  For exam-
ple, the ECJ has been able to draw on support from European elites 
 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 628. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See Hoppe, supra note 141, at 332 (quoting Vienna Convention Decision, Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 19, 2006, 2 BVR 2115/01 (F.R.G.)). 
 147. Garditz, supra note 140, at 632 (arguing that the Court’s discussion “is evasive, or at 
least not explicit”). 
 148. Id. at 629-30. 
 149. See Hoppe, supra note 141 at 332. 
 150. See Movsesian, supra note 5, at 103-04 (discussing the European Court of Justice); id. at 
105 (discussing the European Court of Human Rights). 
 151. See Jose E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and Consequences, 38 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 405, 430 (2003).  For an argument that the Constitutional Court in the Vienna 
Convention Decision improperly ignored the differences between the European Court of Hu-
man Rights and the International Court of Justice, see Garditz, supra note 140, at 633. 
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for the European Union and its goal of greater political integration.152  
Similarly, the ECHR has been able to rely on the sense of shared val-
ues that unites the core members of the Council of Europe.153  There 
is no similar commitment to political integration at the global level, 
nor is there a similar sense of shared identity.154  As a consequence, 
one should not draw general conclusions about international courts 
from the European experience. 
If the VCCR controversy is any indication—and the amount of 
scholarly attention suggests it should be—states are much less recep-
tive to international adjudication than they are to ICA.  Explaining 
why is not difficult.  Many of the factors that account for ICA’s suc-
cess do not exist in the adjudication context.  First, unlike ICA, inter-
national adjudication raises legitimacy concerns.155  International 
courts are not ad hoc contractual arrangements, but permanent insti-
tutions that create substantial bodies of law.  Their judgments increas-
ingly can implicate a state’s exercise of public authority.156  For exam-
ple, Avena purported to override procedural default rules and require 
the reconsideration of numerous criminal convictions across the 
United States.157  The ruling thus aspired to have systemic influence 
on American law – the sort of influence that private arbitral awards 
cannot have. 
The issues that international courts address also differ greatly 
from the run-of-the-mill commercial questions that arise in ICA.158  In 
earlier times, international adjudication often addressed low-key mat-
ters like boundary disputes; states typically did not resist compliance 
 
 152. See Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 489, 529 (2001) (discussing the “elite-driven” nature of European political integra-
tion). 
 153. See J.G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 30-31 (1993). 
 154. See Alvarez, supra note 151, at 430. 
 155. See Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International 
Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 908 (2005). 
 156. Cf. Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 6, at 139-42 (distinguishing between commer-
cial and investment arbitration). 
 157. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 
69-70 (Mar. 31). 
 158. Cf. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 1366 (2008) (distinguishing between ICJ rulings 
in VCCR cases and “a foreign-court judgment settling a typical commercial or property dis-
pute”). 
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with decisions on these matters.159  As the scope of international law 
continues to expand, however, international courts increasingly ad-
dress subjects like civil and political rights, environmental protection, 
and public health.160  These are often highly sensitive topics on which 
global consensus is absent.  Again, Avena provides an illustration.  
Some American officials reacted indignantly to the notion that that 
the ICJ would issue directives on local law enforcement.161  “We have 
a system of justice that provides people with due process and review 
of their cases,” a State Department spokesman objected, “[a]nd it’s 
not appropriate that there be some international court that comes in 
and can reverse decisions of our national courts.”162  Moreover, as 
Peggy McGuinness has observed, the ICJ’s decision implicated Amer-
ica’s continuing reliance on the death penalty, a form of punishment 
that causes controversy abroad, but that remains popular in much of 
the United States.163  However indirectly, the ICJ injected itself into a 
contentious domestic policy debate. 
Because they increasingly address sensitive issues, and because 
their judgments can purport to have a systemic impact on domestic 
law, international courts pose serious legitimacy concerns.  Like arbi-
trators, international judges are largely unaccountable to the public.  
Judges are usually appointed by international organizations removed 
from democratic control.164  For example, members of the ICJ are se-
lected through an arcane process involving the General Assembly and 
 
 159. Cf. Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 104, at 1328  (stating that “the disputes resolved 
by international courts are low stakes relative to larger conflicts”). 
 160. See Young, supra note 5, at 1151-53. 
 161. For the reaction of Virginia’s governor, see Governor Jim Gilmore, Statement Con-
cerning the Execution of Angel Breard (Apr. 14, 1998), in Jonathan I. Charney & W. Michael 
Reisman, Agora: Breard: The Facts, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 666, 674-75 (1998).  For the reaction of 
Arizona’s governor, see Mani Sheik, Comment, From Breard to Medellin: Supreme Court Inac-
tion or ICJ Activism in the Field of International Law?, 94 CAL. L. REV. 531, 544 (2006).  Okla-
homa’s governor, by contrast, argued that the ICJ’s ruling was binding on American courts.  See 
Press Release, Office of Governor Brad Henry, Governor Henry Grants Clemency to Death 
Row Inmate Torres (May 13, 2004), available at http://www.governor.state.ok.us/display_articl-
e.php?article_id=301&article_type=1. 
 162. Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State, Daily Press Briefing (Mar. 10, 
2005), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/43225.htm. 
 163. See generally Margaret E. McGuinness, Medellín, Norm Portals, and the Horizontal 
Integration of International Human Rights, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 755 (2006). 
 164. See Douglas Lee Donoho, Democratic Legitimacy in Human Rights: The Future of In-
ternational Decision-Making, 21 WIS. INT’L L.J. 1, 51 (2003). 
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the Security Council.165  National governments have some input in this 
process, but citizens have virtually none.166  Though citizens also have 
relatively little input in the selection of domestic judges, their partici-
pation in the international context is even more attenuated.  Ameri-
cans generally know little about the workings of the UN, and it is 
hard to imagine many of them tracking the appointment of ICJ 
judges. 
Even setting aside concerns about formal accountability, interna-
tional courts lack the informal ties with local communities that do-
mestic courts enjoy.  Domestic judges are products of one legal cul-
ture; they share similar assumptions and reason along similar lines.167  
As a result, their decisions have a kind of built-in credibility with do-
mestic constituencies.  International judges, by contrast, come from a 
variety of legal traditions, some of which have very different starting 
assumptions and modes of thought.168  At the time of Avena, for ex-
ample, the ICJ had members from China, Egypt, the United States 
and Venezuela.169  Moreover, because of their diverse backgrounds, 
international judges cannot be expected to have the familiarity with 
local conditions that domestic judges have.170  Their opinions can thus 
create unanticipated conflicts with local law.  Recall the Supreme 
Court’s complaint in Sanchez-Llamas that the ICJ failed to appreciate 
the role of procedural default rules in American criminal justice.171 
Second, unlike ICA awards, international court judgments do not 
promote domestic prosperity in an uncontroversial way.  Again, it is 
important to focus on the sorts of disputes that international courts 
increasingly address.  Rulings on subjects like criminal justice and 
civil rights advance important human values, but they do not neces-
 
 165. See generally MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 961-62 (5th ed. 2003) (giving 
a description of the process). 
 166. See Movsesian, supra note 5, at 97. 
 167. See Ginsburg, supra note 89, at 1336-37 (discussing varieties of legal culture). 
 168. See ICJ Statute, supra note 100, art. 9 (providing that members of the Court should 
“represent[] . . . the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world”). 
 169. See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 
12, 14 (Mar. 31) (listing members of the Court). 
 170. See Shany, supra note 155, at 920 n.78 (noting that national courts are “‘in principle 
better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions’” (citation omit-
ted)). 
 171. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2685-86 (2006). 
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sarily contribute to a state’s GDP.172  (It is true that by promoting the 
rule of law generally, international judgments in these areas can con-
tribute over time to national economic growth, but the connection is 
an attenuated one).173  Moreover, even when they are consistent with 
economic development, rulings on these subjects are much more 
likely than ICA awards to involve public policy questions on which 
states strongly disagree. 
To be sure, international court judgments in the trade area may 
have a direct impact on economic growth.  For example, by requiring 
states to forgo protectionist laws, the WTO can facilitate comparative 
advantage and promote domestic prosperity.174 But the benefits of 
WTO rulings do not depend upon domestic-court enforcement.  The 
WTO can effectively police protectionism by authorizing injured 
states to retaliate against offending states, without involving domestic 
courts.175  By contrast, the benefits of ICA—neutrality, confidentiality, 
expertise—depend on domestic-court enforcement.  A state-to-state 
mechanism would not work as well.  If domestic courts did not en-
force them, awards would have much less practical value for firms, 
and ICA could do little to facilitate international commerce.176 
Third, because international adjudication does not create the 
powerful financial incentives that ICA does, it cannot motivate as 
much support from domestic constituencies.  Neither businesses nor 
large law firms have great interest in lobbying for domestic enforce-
ment of international court judgments.  To be sure, some lawyers and 
law professors support a greater role for international courts.177  The 
amicus briefs in, and commentaries on, Sanchez-Llamas suggest that 
most international law scholars believe that the Supreme Court 
 
 172. Cf. Randall Peerenboom, The Fire-Breathing Dragon and the Cute, Cuddly Panda: The 
Implications of China’s Rise for Developing Countries, Human Rights, and Geopolitical Stability, 
7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 17, 30-31 (2006) (noting that authoritarian regimes can achieve economic 
growth while restricting civil and political rights). 
 173. Tyler Cohen, Caring About the Distant Future: Why It Matters and What It Means, 74 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 5, 36 (2007) (“Empirical research suggests that a stable market order, private 
property, and the rule of law are strongly correlated with economic growth.”). 
 174. See Mark L. Movsesian, Enforcement of WTO Rulings: An Interest Group Analysis, 32 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 6 (2003). 
 175. See id. at 10-11; Jide Nzelibe, The Credibility Imperative: The Political Dynamics of Re-
taliation in the World Trade Organizations Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 6 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES  L. 215, 217 (2005). 
 176. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 177. See Movsesian, supra note 5, at 69 n.23 (discussing “the ‘comity model’ that has gained 
considerable academic currency in recent years”). 
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should have deferred to the ICJ.178  Most probably believe that the 
Court should have enforced the ICJ’s judgment in Medellin.179  But 
these lawyers and law professors are driven primarily by political and 
ideological commitments.  While there may be some professional re-
wards for promoting international adjudication—the possibility of an 
appointment to an international tribunal, a greater reputation in the 
academy—they cannot, by their nature, entice many people. 
To be sure, political and ideological commitments can be strong 
motivators, and I do not wish to minimize the dedication or sincerity 
of the lawyers and law professors who support international adjudica-
tion.  Some of these lawyers and scholars have devoted their careers 
to promoting international courts, which they see as a vehicle for 
global progress.  My point, rather, is that the absence of financial in-
centives helps explain why international adjudication has less support 
among domestic constituencies that ICA does.  Along with the other 
factors I have discussed, the lack of interest-group involvement ex-
plains why states are less receptive to international adjudication than 
they are to ICA. 
CONCLUSION 
The question the editors have asked us to address reflects an un-
derstandable puzzlement.  Why have states embraced ICA but not in-
ternational courts?  As this essay has shown, the reasons are not so 
hard to make out.  ICA and international adjudication differ greatly.  
ICA avoids legitimacy problems, fosters domestic growth, and ap-
peals to influential domestic constituencies.  By contrast, interna-
tional adjudication raises serious legitimacy concerns, does not foster 
economic growth so clearly, and cannot rely on the same level of in-
terest-group support.  These differences explain why states are more 
receptive to ICA awards than the judgments of international courts. 
 
 
 178. See, e.g., Brief for International Court of Justice Experts as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2005) (Nos. 04-10566 and 05-51), 2005 
WL 3597806. 
 179. See, e.g., Brief for International Court of Justice Experts as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984), 2007 WL 1886207. 
